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CORPORATIONS-VOTING TRUSTS-NON-COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTE AS
BASIS FOR JUDICIAL TERMINATION-Common stockholders of a corporation
which had on December 15, 1938 made a valid five year extension of a voting
trust agreement originally entered into on January 22, 1929 attempted on May
27, 1939, to extend further the agreement for an additional five years. Following a dispute over the election of corporate directors almost two years after
the termination of the first extension, certain holders of voting trust certificates
brought bills in chancery to compel redelivery of the common stock registered in
the names of the voting trustees and to declare the invalidity of the election.
Held, the instrument of May 27, 1939 cannot be sustained as a new agreement
because it uses language of extension without sufficient innovations to distinguish
it from the original agreement. It cannot be sustained as a valid extension since
it was not executed within the year immediately preceding the expiratio_n date of
the agreement sought to be extended.1 Further, the public policy of this state as
announced by the legislature will not be disturbed by the application of the doctrines of clean hands or estoppel. Belle Isle Corp. v. Corcoran, (Del. 1946)
49 A. (2d) I.

1 "At any time within one year prior to the time of expiration of any such voting
trust agreement as originally :fixed or as extended as herein provided, one or more beneficiaries of the trust under such voting trust agreement may, by agreement in writing
and with the written consent of such Voting Trustees, extend-the duration of such
voting trust agreement for an additional period not exceeding ten years •.. provided,
however, that no such extension agi::eement shall affect the rights or obligations of persons not parties thereto." Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 2050:
·
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RECENT DECISIONS

This decision continues the Delaware judicial policy of terminating at the
suit of interested parties voting trusts not executed in strict conformity with the
voting trust statute,2 evep. though such trusts, could be sustained by judicial interpretation of the trust instrument. Prior to the decision in the principal case, the
Delaware courts had occasion to announce that its voting trust statute is applicable only to strictly defined arrangements, 8 that some of its provisions are enforceable as duties rather than mandatory as pre-requisites to validity/ but that
any voting trust which does not conform 5 to that statute's mandatory requirements will be terminated as invalid. 6 However, aside from a general statement
that "the provisions of our statute governing voting trusts are mandatory," 7
non-compliance with the duration provision 8 was the only decided ground of
statutory invalidity until the present case.9 This case, although admitting that
the stockholders could have entered into a new agreement on the same day they
executed the invalid extension,1° flatly refused to interpret the extension agreement as a new agreement in order to save it. The decision will probably be
criticized for its interpretation of statutory policy,11 particularly by those commentators who feel that voting trusts are necessary business devices which should
be fostered rather than restricted by court and legislature. 12 It may also be
criticized for its refusal to determine whether third persons would be injured by
termination 18 or whether complainants sought termination in order to further a
fraudulent purpose.u However, recent thought has returned to the belief that
except where necessary the law should not allow the stockholder to be deprived
2

Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 2050.
Aldridge v. Franco Wyoming Oil Co., 24 Del. Ch. 126, 7 A. (2d) 753 (1939).
4
Hirschwald v. Erlebacher, Inc., (Del. Ch. 1943) 29 A. (2d) 798.
5
For a comment on the distinction between substantial and strict compliance, see
44 MicH. L. REV. 1048 (1946).
6
Perry v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 22 Del. Ch. 33, 191 A. 823 (1937).
, 1 Id. at 42.
8
" • • • for any period of time determined by such agreement, not exceeding ten
years .••." Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 2050.
9
Perry v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 22 Del. Ch. 33, 191 A. 823 (1937).
Cf. Kittinger v. Churchill Evangelistic Assn., 151 Misc. 350, 271 N.Y.S. 510 (1934),
noted in 33 MicH. L. REV. 804 (1935). Also Hanley v. Most, 9 Wash. (2d) 429,
II5 P. (2d) 951, II8 P. (2d) 1946 (1941); Venner v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 25ll
Ill. 523, IOI N.E. 949 (1913).
10 Principal case at 4. See also decision in the lower court, (Del. Ch. 1946) 46 A.
(2d) 749 at 757.
11 Principal case at 4. See also decision in the lower court, (Del. Ch. I 946) 46 A.
(2d) 749 at 759. However, this decision places no obstacles in the way of corporations
wishing to use the voting trust deY-ice, for they need only hire attorneys not averse to
reading the statutes.
12 Gose, "Legal Characteristics and Consequences of Voting Trusts," 20 WASH.
L. REv. 129 (1945); Horne, "Voting Trust Agreements in Indiana," 19 IND. L. J.
225 (1944); Burke, "Voting Trusts Currently Observed," 24 MINN. L. Riv. 347
(1940); 38 CoL. L. REv. 508 (1938); 34 MicH. L. REv. 727 (1936).
18
Principal case at 4. Cf. Unckles v. Colgate, 148 N.Y. 529 at 536, 43 N.E. 59
(1896); Felt v. United States Mortgage & Trust Co., 231 Ill. App. 1IO at 142
(1923) and the criticism of the latter case in CusHING, VoTING TRUSTS 130 (1927).
14 Principal case at 4. See also decision in the lower court, (Del. Ch. l 946) 46 A.
(2d) 749 at 760.
8
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of his last vestige of corporate control.15 In this light, the decision in the principal
case may. be commended. For although statutory invalidity has no necessary correlation to the necessity for a voting trust, the Delaware Supreme Court actually refused to interpret the extension agreement so as to find statutory compliance in a
case where it was alleged 16 that the purpose of the trust had been accomplished.17

Robert K. Eifler, S.Ed.

15 28 GEO. L. J. II21 (1940); LEAVITT, THE VOTING TRUST, c. 8 (1941);
Ballantine, "Voting Trusts, Their Abuses and Regulation," 21 TEX. L. REv. 139
(1942).
,
16 See report of the principal case in the lower court, (Del. Ch. 1946) 46 A. (2d)
749 at 760.
-,
17 Perhaps the court was merely following the suggestion that "in the long run, the
courts might do well to leave the amendment of statutes to the legislature." Gose,
"Legal Characteristics-and Consequences of Voting Trusts," 20 WASH. L. REV. 129 at
146 (1945).

